What led to the most recent deal between Ankara and Turkey and how to make sense of it in a region in constant turmoil, where the lines that link friends and separate enemies are as complex as never before
Last Monday, after almost two years of negotiations, Israel and Turkey reached an agreement that will re-establish full diplomatic relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv.
The relations between the two countries were interrupted in 2010, when soldiers of the IDF attacked a Turkish vessel –the Mavi Marmara– that was trying to violate the blockade imposed on the Gaza strip and killed 10 activists who were on board. In a moment in time in which Israeli-Turkish relations were already tense, the episode of the Mavi Marmara was the event that led to the definitive collapse.
Six years of distance, two years of negotiations, and a constant deterioration of the security scenario in the Middle East were necessary to convince Ankara and Tel Aviv of the necessity to retie bounds and reach a deal.
The deal, announced on Monday by Netanyahu and Yildrim, does not represent a full success for either party (as it is, after all, the destiny of any credible diplomatic negotiation). Nevertheless, each side managed to have accepted at least some of its most pressing requests and to avoid making too dramatic concessions.
Of the three requests it had advanced, Turkey obtained from Israel formal apologies for the Mavi Marmara episode, as well as a compensation of 20 million $ for the families of the victims. Instead, the third request -the lifting of the naval blockade on Gaza- was (unsurprisingly) rejected by Israel. To the Israeli government, in fact, the naval blockade is crucial to escape the risk of weapons ending up in Hamas’ hands and threatening Israel’s national security. However, Ankara obtained the permit to transfer aid to Gaza through the Israeli port of Ashdod, managing in this way to preserve its credibility as defender of the Palestinian cause.
On its part, Israel obtained from Turkey the commitment to intervene heavy-handedly against any attempt made by Hamas to hit Israel from Turkish soil. In this way, Netanyahu managed not to damage his own credibility as guarantor of security in the eyes of the Israeli right-wingers and the Likud voters. Similarily, imposing the maintenance of the blockade on Gaza, he succeeded in preserving his image as strong and resolute leader.
Conversely, what caused outrage in the Israeli public opinion and political leadership, is the fact that Netanyahu did not succeed in obtaining from part of Hamas the restitution of the bodies of two IDF soldiers whom had been killed in Gaza in summer 2014, and the fact that he had to give in to the 20 million $ compensation.
Despite the criticism, though, the deal is fundamentally balanced, as it does not create winners nor losers. It is the result of a balance of interests and compromises that allowed both governments –at home- to present the deal as a success of foreign policy and –abroad- to strengthen their image and diplomatic stature.
Analyzed the terms of the deal, it is now to be asked what led Ankara and Tel Aviv to seek it. Which considerations and which interests are there behind a rapprochement that took six years to materialize?
Undoubtedly, the reason that for both countries played a major role is the deterioration of security in the Middle East, where civil wars, failed states, and terrorism have made it clear to Israel and Turkey how necessary it is to sow new bilateral relations and seek new room for cooperation.
It has been now almost 5 years, that the Syrian civil war and the collapse of the Iraqi state have been continuously producing for the regions’ security threats and challenges that Israel and Turkey must necessarily deal with.
Turkey, in particular, in the past few years has been observing with fear the rise of Kurdish separatism in Syria, that –like a spark ignited by the Syrian conflict- is now setting on fire Kurdish separatism in Turkey, and thus posing threats to the country’s integrity and security. In this context, it has become crucial for Ankara to to seek a resolution to the conflict that takes into account its own national interests, but the deterioration of relations with Putin’s Russia (only now starting to be improved again) and the failure of Erdogan’s “zero problems with neighbors” policy has led Turkey to seek new ties and new friends in the region and to deem it rational a reconciliation with Israel.
Tel Aviv, for its part, is interested in the Syrian dynamics because of the way in which the Syrian war has created a fertile soil for the ascent of its historic enemies: Iran and Hezbollah. Active on the Syrian military landscape, indeed, Israel’s enemies (especially Teheran) have obtained not only military successes on the ground but they have also seen their political influence grow, they have obtained more say in the Levant’s developments, and have extended their range of action.
In front of such threat, it has thus become crucial for Israel to counterbalance Iran’s influence and prevent the rise of Hezbollah; and doing so has required Tel Aviv to seek regional partners and to look West towards Turkey.
Both Tel Aviv and Ankara, then, have a direct enemy in jihadist terrorism – of which Turkey has become privileged victim over the last year. Confronted with this common threat, a rapprochement between Israel and Turkey has emerged in the two capitals as first and necessary step towards a possible future cooperation in the fight against terrorism, which is perceived by the political class and by the public opinion of both countries as a priority.
To these security considerations, then, other calculations need to be added.
For both countries, in fact, the recent deal was motivated not only by geopolitical and geostrategic interests, but –as Netanyahu himself pointed out in presenting the deal to the Israeli public- also by economic calculations.
Indeed, the deal could now make it possible for Israel to sell the gas of which it is abundant to Turkey and –through it- to many European countries.
For its part, Turkey could benefit from buying gas from Israel since this would allow it to diversify its pool of gas suppliers nad become less vulnerable and less dependent on Russian gas.
Israel and Turkey have thus more than one single reason to retrieve their diplomatic relations. As seen, interests of national and regional security and economic interests have laid the bases to reach a deal with which Ankara and Tel Aviv are fundamentally trying to see how far can a future multi-dimensional cooperation be led, and how realistic it is to go over a thrust deficit that the developments of the past years require now to overcome.
(Photo credit: Kobi Gideon/FLASH90)