Rising tensions across the Levant

 

The last week has witnessed a heightening of tensions between Syria and Israel. Far from being a two-actor tale, this escalation is expression of the delicate balances of power and axes of alliance involving all the actors of the Syrian war

 

In the Middle East’s complex and ever-evolving arena, the past days have been marked by a worrying escalation of tensions between Syria and Israel. This escalation, that is now adding to the troubles the Levant is already facing, is taking place after a series of incidents that have occurred over the last week and that are the most serious cases of direct Israeli-Syrian confrontation since the Syrian civil war began in 2011.

It all began last Friday when Israeli warplanes conducted a series of air raids near Palmyra against convoys suspected of transferring weapons to Hezbollah. As a response, the Syrian government fired a number of missiles towards Israeli jets and -according to Israeli, Syrian and Lebanese reports- an Israeli drone was even shot down on Monday by Syrian aerial defense systems. Since then, tensions between the two countries have been worsening, with each side warning the other against the risks of retaliation and claiming its resoluteness not to leave attacks un-responded.

 

As these worrisome events unfold in the Levant, understanding the strategic considerations lying behind them, their significance as eventual “game changers”, and their likely future impact on the regional post-war settlement, requires to look at the broader set of actors involved in the Syrian conflict, at the specific regional and national interests motivating each of them, and at the peculiarities of the alliances of which they are part.

 

Of the many foreign actors involved in the Syrian conflict, a major role –both on the battlefield and at the negotiating table- is that played by Russia since its direct intervention in September 2015.  Committed to guaranteeing the survival of its Alawite friend, and allied in its military activities and political moves to Iran and Hezbollah, Moscow is nonetheless determined to oppose any military strategy against Israel that its allies might want to pursue. In particular, it wants to avoid any destabilization on part of its war allies of the border along the Golan Heights (an area bitterly disputed since 1967) since a similar course of action might end up dragging Russia in an unwanted confrontation with Israel. For Russia, indeed, cooperating in the Syrian conflict with Iran and Hezbollah but keeping itself at a distance from their regional ambitions against Israel is the win-win strategy par excellence.

It is this position endorsed by Russia that has led Netanyahu to Moscow more than once (the latest on March 9th), as he sees in Putin an important partner to deter Iran and Hezbollah from challenging Israel’s interests. However, as political analysts and policymakers begin to see an end to the Syrian conflict, the weight of Iran and Hezbollah in negotiating a post-war settlement is something that Russia cannot ignore if it wants to play the role of mediator and peace-broker to which it aspires. In other words, if until now Russia has been able to find a balance between avoiding tensions with Israel over crucial (and to Israel indeed vital) issues such as the Golan border and preserving a united front with its war allies Iran and Hezbollah, continuing to do so is becoming ever more difficult for Moscow.

For its part, Damascus is similarly interested in preventing Iran and Hezbollah from turning the border region along the Golan into a future battlefield that would risk seeing Syria involved in another regional conflict that the country cannot afford (economically, militarily, demographically). However, the Syrian government has become ever more self-confident over the past months and last week’s counter-strikes against Israel not only strengthen the credibility of the regime’s image but also stand as real “game-changers” in the regional balance of power. Indeed, if Israel’s attacks against arms shipments to Hezbollah are nothing new, Syrian assertive response is instead a new factor that has to be dealt with.

On the contrary, Iran and Hezbollah are united in their aspiration to exploit the context of the Syrian civil war, the regional instability triggered by it, and the questionability of the regional borders that it has brought about, to revive the dispute over the Golan area and reignite direct confrontation with Israel. Strong of the successes that they have been achieving during the years of war, Hezbollah and Iran see now themselves in the right military position and with the right diplomatic leverage to destabilize at their advantage the Golan area – an area which is geo-strategically crucial for the pursuit of their security interests in the context of their historical hostility with Israel.

On the opposite side of the conflict, then, there is Israel, whose involvement in the Syrian civil war responds to considerations of national security and, in particular, to the need of preventing any meaningful success for Iran and Hezbollah that might turn them into major and powerful regional actors.  For Tel Aviv, a non-questionable tenet of its security policy is the preservation of the Golan border as defined unilaterally by itself in 1967. Therefore, it perceives as especially worrying the threats posed to the stability of the area by Iran and Hezbollah, and it is to the perception of these threats that one has to look to explain last week’s air raids against weapons convoys headed to Hezbollah.

In addition, Israel aspires to have a say in the post-war regional settlement in order to protect its interests and avert the creation of non-favourable centres of powers along its borders. In this light, last week’s attacks stand thus as Israel’s reminders of its weight and “voice” in the definition of regional balances.

 

In conclusion, as each actor pursues its own interests as peculiarly defined against the prospect of an end of the Syrian war, the escalation between Syria and Israel and the possibility of a post-war confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah/Iran over the Golan have the potential to become the most serious challenges to the region’s equilibrium in the upcoming future.

Interestingly enough, the resolution of these challenges will largely depend on Russia’s capacity to maintain even in a post-war context its crucial balancing role and to adapt it to the changing circumstances on the ground.

 

[Picture rights: Israeli Defense Ministry]

 

When occupation is made legal – The latest chapter in a saga of expropriation and humiliation

 

The law approved by the Knesset legalizes Israel’s territorial occupation and adds a step to Netanyahu’s run towards the cancellation of any viability of the two-state solution

 

Last Monday the Israeli Knesset approved 60 to 52 the so-called Regulation Bill. According to this law, about 4,000 Israeli settlements built in the West Bank on private Palestinian land will obtain retroactive legitimization as long as the settlers can prove that they were not aware that land was Palestinian private property. Once this is proved, they will obtain the legal permit to remain in their houses, while the legitimate Palestinian owners will have two possibilities: either accept an alternative plot of land where such an offer does exist; or accept a financial compensation set by an ad hoc committee created by the Israeli government.

The Regulation Bill results from a proposal advanced over the past months by the ultra-right Jewish Home Party in reaction to the High Court’s decision to dismantle the illegal outpost of Amona. The choice to refer this proposal to the Knesset reveals thus Netanyahu’s need to find an uneasy balance between external and internal pressures. On the one hand, the Israeli PM has to take into account the stance of the international community and avoid policies that might condemn Israel to isolation; on the other hand, Netanyahu is leading a coalition government whose survivability depends on ultra-right parties (such as Jewish Home), which forces him to take into due consideration these parties’ requests.

That the proposal was not only submitted to the Knesset but even received its endorsement is then sign of a whole other series of factors –both internal and external- that characterize and influence today Israel’s politics.

Above all, the law’s approval reveals the high degree of influence that ultra-right groups have managed to carve out for themselves in the current political environment, where fra from being a marginal force they are a leading force capable of directing policies and law. Tightly linked to the ultra-right ascent is that of those groups that support the policy of settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and that, over the past months, have obtained important victories (among the latest the announcement that 6,000 new settlements will soon be built).

Finally, the Knesset’s vote comes as latest confirmation of the renewed confidence of the Israeli Right in front of an American administration that has adopted until now a mild line on Israel’s settlements. After Monday’s vote, in fact, Trump’s government limited itself to make reference to a previous comment on how settlements “may not be helpful” in the framework of negotiating a future Israeli-Palestinian peace, but it postponed further comments to the Israeli Supreme Court’s upcoming pronouncement.

Different reactions, instead, have come from the international community, the Palestinian government, and also from leading figures and NGOs within Israel.

The UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres has condemned the vote as a violation of international law, and similar words also came from the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs who recalled the UNSC Resolution 2334 recently adopted in condemnation of Israel’s settlements.

In line with the international community was also the reaction of some Israeli NGOs such as Peace Now and Yesh Din that voiced their intention to appeal to the Supreme Court, as well as from the Attorney General Avichai Mandelblit who warned against the adoption of a law that violates Palestinians’ property rights and who stated his refusal to defend the law.

On its part, the PLO defined the law a “legitimization of theft” that violates international law and ends any prospect of a two-state solution, and it declared its intention to appeal to the ICC to fight the impunity that Israel seems to enjoy in front of a Statute of Rome that should apply to all states.

After Monday’s vote, it is now to be waited for the Supreme Court’s verdict. In any case, the mere fact that the law met the approval of the Knesset confirms how the Israeli government is far from seeking a solution that leads to a Palestinian state ad how it aims on the contrary to have a single Jewish state built on as much land as possible and legitimized by any legal means possible.

 

[Picture Rights: Wojtek Arciszewski/Al Jazeera]

 

Is Bibi’s political career coming to its end?

The official opening of the investigative process against Netanyahu is the chance to shed light on moves and strategies of the major Israeli political forces in a moment of high uncertainty and fragility  

 

On January 2nd, the visit to the house of the Israeli PM on part of an investigative team of the Anti-Corruption Unit Lahav 433 marked the official beginning of the criminal enquiry against Netanyahu. The talk with the PM lasted three hours and marked the outset of an investigative procedure that that has placed Bibi at the heart of the Israeli public debate.

At this respect, though, it is to be noted that it is not an unprecedented debate, since it is not the first time that a similar episode comes to challenge Israel’s political stability: as early as 1996, in fact, Netanyahu was the first PM to be placed under criminal investigation while in office; after him, it was the turn of Barak and Sharon; and, finally, there was the trial against Olmert, the first PM to be found guilty and sentenced to prison.

 

Last Monday, the criminal investigation against Netanyahu was initiated by the police with the approval of the Attorney General Mandelbit, who had first opened a probe against the PM last June, following alleged proves of corruption raised by the Unit Lahav 433.

To be under investigation are relationships founded on the exchange of gifts and favors that Netanyahu seems to have maintained with various businessmen, both Israeli and foreigner, and that might involve criminal activities and affairs. In particular, the attention of the police is focused on deals for the purchase of arms signed with the German firm ThyssenKrupp and on the relationship between Netanyahu and the French Arnaud Mimran, already condemned for fraud.

 

The above picture was then made even more complex by the news reported by Haaretz according to which the investigation would also involve the tape of a conversation between Netanyahu and Arnon Mozes –owner of the Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth– in which the two men seem to reach a deal that would grant Mozes financial and business benefits in exchange for a pro-Netanyahu coverage. The deal, that would ensure Mozes primacy within the Israeli media and journalistic system, has caused much scandal because it directly affects the faith of the Israelis in their information system and –more specifically- in Mozes’s newspaper, whose impartiality and independence has always been praised by the Israelis.

 

While the procedure has just entered its first stage and we are still in a phase of speculations, suppositions, and waiting, what is interesting to look at is what the affair reveals on the current reality of Israeli politics and its major actors – Netanyahu, his Likud Party, and the Opposition to it.

 

As far as Netanyahu is concerned, the episode reveals his great capacity (already proven along the years and in the previous periods of ups and downs of his political career) of turning the cards of the Israeli political game in his favor. Faced with the accusations, in fact, Netanyahu promptly admitted having accepted gifts from businessmen with whom he had/has relationships, but stressed that they never went beyond what is legal.

By so doing, Netanyahu effectively presented himself to the Israeli public as the “victim” of a series of accusations that have no foundation and are politically-motivated. With a post on his Facebook page, Netanyahu has thus tried to turn the entire issue on his favor talking of a “persecution” that has been going on for years against him and his family and creating a sense of “discrimination” among his electoral basin – that seems indeed to have rallied around the leader to defend his innocence.

In a delicate juncture, in which Netanyahu’s political future is at stake, the PM has shown great ability in strengthening the consent of his voters; in making them a united front suspicious of all the forces (political and non-political alike) that lie outside the Likud and its ultra-right coalition; and in creating cohesion within the right-wing fringes of the Israeli population. Successfully exploited by Netanyahu, this strategy is worth being given attention as it seems to be the main factor that it is enabling Netanyahu to ride the wave of events rather than being drawn by it.

 

Similar dynamics of “rallying around the leader” are at play even within the Party that Netanyahu leads. Indeed, faced with the accusations raised against Netanyahu and with the risk incumbent upon the party’s prestige and power, even the Likud members traditionally less close to the PM have set aside their personal frictions and made themselves united in the defense of their leader and in labelling as merely “political” the accusations against him. Following the line adopted by Netanyahu himself that shouts at the political machination and plot, ministers such as Tzachi Hanegbi and Miri Regev have depicted the whole process as a “persecution” conceived and carried out by an Israeli left that is trying with all means to end Netanyahu’s government.

 

However, observing the behavior of this final actor of the Israeli political theatre –the Opposition to the extreme right led by Bibi- it emerges interestingly how it is actually maintaining a low profile with respect to the issue and avoiding fierce attacks against the PM.

The logic behind this strategy is the awareness that, in a delicate moment for the country’s political future as this might turn out to be, any reckless move and any hasty word could backfire. It is therefore reckoned to be wiser to wait the unfolding of events before embracing a harsh rhetoric that might risk legitimizing Netanyahu’s claims of a political plot being set up against him. It is thus in the context of this logic that it is possible to explain the caution shown until now by the Opposition leader Yair Lapid, who limited himself to moderate words of criticism towards the PM and who seems determined to wait for the outcome of the affair before moving to the offensive and conducting the final attack against Netanyahu.

 

As of now, Israel finds itself in a situation of nervous waiting, of uncertainty on the PM’s political future, of internal debate on the meaning of the accusations against him; and only the outcome of the investigation will be able to tell what the next moves of the major actros of the Israeli politics will be.

Bibi’s great refusal

 

The proposal of dialogue coming from Paris has revealed all the difficulties inherent in an effective revival of the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue, with the Israeli front led by an extreme-Right coalition not interested in dialogue and a Palestinian front that claims to be disposed to talk but which is actually too weak to

 

The last attempt made by third parties to encourage a revival of the dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians was made in 2014 by a then hopeful –but soon disillusioned- John Kerry, and collapsed a few months later after the reconciliation agreement reached by Abbas’ Palestinian Authority (PA) and a Hamas that the international community has always resented to regard as legitimate and reliable partner in attempts at dialogue and peace-building.

Two years after the failure of the Obama administration, it was France who proposed over the last months to promote a new Israeli-Palestinian dialogue, but once again hope has soon been replaced by resignation. Last Monday, in fact, during the visit in Israel by France’s envoy Pierre Vemont, Netanyahu voices his neat and irrevocable refusal to take part in any such dialogue as proposed by Paris and the PM’s “no” seems to have curbed the French proposal for good.

 

On the background of a Middle Eastern scenario ever more dispiriting –with Yemen and Syria doomed to an endless civil war, and an Iraq over which the threat of ethnic and religious sectarianism is looming again as the battle for Mosul goes on- Netanyahu’s “no” becomes the last piece of a bleak puzzle and the latest proof of how any prospect of an open, sincere and credible dialogue within the Israeli-Palestinian context is ever more utopic.

 

In particular, Netanyahu’s refusal reveals in an undeniable and worrying way how the Israeli government is dominated by an extreme-right coalition that conceals its extremism behind weak justifications and pretexts. Despite Netanyahu’s government justifying his stance with respect to the French proposal saying it is open only to initiatives coming directly from the Palestinians and only to proposals for a bilateral dialogue, Tel Aviv’s refusal is nothing but a clear closure to any possibility of dialogue. The refusal to convene in Paris, in fact, cannot be seen as an incentive to encourage the Palestinians to direct and bilateral dialogues with Israel (despite this being the Israeli government’s rhetoric) but only as a rejection of any initiative that aspires to promote negotiation and to address the demands of Palestinian nationalism.

 

To counterbalance Netanyahu’s refusal came instead the acceptance of the French proposal on part of Abbas and Erekat, who declared their openness to a multilateral dialogue encouraged by a third party.

Clearly, Abbas’ “yes ” is ot enough to make of the Palestinian front the ideal partner in a dialogue as complex as the one between Tel Aviv and Ramallah.  Indeed, within the Palestinian political picture there continue to exist deep divisions between the PA and Hamas (with a series of minor parties and groups to complicate internal factionalism) and this rises doubts on the Palestinians’ capacity to select for the process of dialogue figures truly capable to represent the whole Palestinian people and all the colours that make up its social and political reality.

 

Paris’ proposal, thus, failed in changing the stalemate in which the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue has been for the past two years, but it has nonetheless contributed to make light on the difficulties that continue to obstruct dialogue and on the subsequent steps that the international community should take. From this point of view, as far as the Israeli front is concerned, USA and EU should use their diplomatic and economic leverage to induce the Israeli Right that is currently ruling the country to moderate its stance and its most controversial policies (above all that of settlements in the occupied territories). On the other hand, as far as the Palestinian front is concerned, it would be necessary to encourage truly inclusive elections, capable of giving to the Palestinian people that undivided and legitimate voice that is essential for dialogue to start.

 

Until this is done, the Israeli “no” will remain an immovable obstacle and the Palestinian “yes” an empty assent.

 

 

[Picture rights: Atef Safadi/Reuters]

The threat of “making Israel and America safe again”

On Wednesday 26th October, in Jerusalem’s Old City (a place born to be the world’s most peaceful but too often turned into the region’s most turbulent) about 250 Israeli-Americans gathered to voice their support for Donald Trump as future US President.

Most of those who gathered there were from the community of 200,000 Israeli-Americans who currently live in Israel and especially from among the 60,000 Americans who live in Israeli settlements in the West Bank.

 

The event, organized by Republicans Overseas in Israel, was named “Jerusalem forever” so as to voice the group’s condemnation of the latest resolution adopted by UNESCO that came to condemn Israeli policies with respect to the al-Aqsa compound, and in which reference to the holy place is made exclusively with their Muslim/Arabic names. This made of the event not only a rally in support for the Republican Presidential candidate but a rally in support of an ever more radical Israeli Right.

 

Although attended by merely 250 people, the rally was important because it came to represent a radicalization of views, opinions and rhetoric on part of both Trump and Israeli right-wingers.

 

At the beginning of his Presidential race some months ago, Trump decided to avoid strong and well-defined opinions regarding his eventual Israeli policy, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the question of whether the US should move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

More recently, though, he has changed his attitude and in recent speeches Mr Trump has presented himself as the one who, if elected President, will revive the US-Israeli historical friendship. Particularly, he has stressed the interests that Washington and Tel Aviv share when it comes to regional threats and regional security, saying that the US and Israel will stand together to enemies like Iran so as to “make Israel and American safe again”.

In addition, he also came to adopt more outspoken and clear positions on delicate issues such as settlements (that his advisor on Israel David Friedman defined at Wednesday’s rally as being “not illegal”) and the status of Jerusalem, which he recognizes as the indisputably legitimate capital of the state of Israel where the American Embassy should be.

 

Such a rhetorical shift on part of Mr Trump goes along well with the increasing radicalism of Israel’s right-wingers, who are eager to support any candidate with pro-settlement stances such as Mr Trump is showing.

Even if the vote of Israeli-Americans will not have much of an impact on the US elections, still it proves how central the issue of Israeli settlements in the West Bank is in defining future US-Israeli relationship. Moreover, it also shows how the influential community of Israeli settlers approaches any political issue through the prism of “land acquisition/expropriation” in the attempt of legitimizing a situation which remains one of the greatest failures of our times in the application of International Law.

 

 

[Picture rights: Shaina Shealy/Al Jazeera]

The US-Israel friendship between military agreements and the American elections

The military agreement signed by the US and Israel reinforces not only the military partnership between the two allies but also the tacit support given by Bibi to Trump’s eventual victory

 

Last week, after months of long negotiations and tiring compromises, the US and Israel signed a new military agreement that strengthens their bilateral cooperation in the sector.

 

According to the agreement, which will enter into force in 2019 and will last for a decade, the US will give Israel 3.8 billion $ per year in military support, for a total of 38 billion $ – of which 33 billion devoted to the purchase of armies and munitions and 5 billion destined to missile defense. The agreement implies thus an important increase in terms of financial support, if compared with the 30 billion foreseen in the current agreement and due to expire soon. The latest agreement between the US and Israel –known as Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)- is indeed the biggest military support ever approved by Washington towards an allied country.

Nevertheless, the agreement did not come without a cost for Israel and Netanyahu’s government, that had not only to renounce the initial request of 45 billion $ in ten years but also had to bend to some provisions that raised voices of criticism in Tel Aviv. In the specific of these provisions, Israel accepted not to seek further financial aid on part of the American Congress over the next ten years and to limit expenditures in the Israeli military industry to give precedence to the American one.

 

The just-signed MOU represents thus an important milestone in the relationship between Washington and Tel Aviv, but it is also a useful lens through which to read the approach of both Obama and Bibi to the upcoming American Presidential elections.

 

On Obama’s side, many analysts and experts have underlined how the American President invested the last months in reaching an agreement with Israel in order to conclude with a diplomatic victory his political legacy – especially in fields in which he has been widely criticized such as of foreign policy and Middle Eastern politics.

In terms of the next American Presidential elections, then, the agreement can be read as the fruit of Obama’s attempt to strengthen the image of the Democratic Party in the eyes of two influence groups of traditional Republican leaning – the arms lobby and the American Jewry. Indeed, the agreement contains provisions that (as seen above) ensure economic advnategs for the American military industry and, being an unprecedented agreement in terms of numbers, it hails the relationship between the Obama administration and those pro-Israel American Jews who have in the past denounced as too cold the President’s approach to Israel.

Specular is then the attempt to delegitimize those voices within the Republican Party that criticize Obama for the tensions that during the years of his mandate have risked damaging the traditional friendship between the US and Israel – a country that large part of the American electorate still regards as Washington’s only reliable ally in the Middle East and as only reliable bulwark against the threat posed by terrorism and radical Islamism.

 

On Netanyahu’s side, instead, the agreement was sought because seen as crucial to preserve the qualitative military superiority of Israel vis-à-vis its neighbors and thus ensure the Jewish state’s security and deterrence capacity.

In terms of the next American Presidential elections, then, the decision of signing the agreement before Obama goes home rises from the uncertainties that surround the choice of the next American President. At this respect, Netanyahu has thus far refused to take an explicit position (contrary to what he did in 2012 when he was a professed supporter of Romney). Nevertheless, it is plausible to assume that in Tel Aviv the ascent of Trump to the White House is seen more favorably than that of Clinton, whose stance on Israel is deemed by Bibi as not sufficiently different from Obama’s and excessively centered on the dialogue with the Palestinian Authority and the condemnation of Israel’s settlements.

Now, the recent military agreement goes to reinforce such assumption.

 

Indeed, as far as Middle Eastern politics and Middle Eastern security dynamics are concerned, Netanyahu and Trump have over the past months revealed to share not few opinions. Just like Bibi, Trump has more than once criticized last year’s nuclear agreement with Iran and he too reads Iran’s economic and political ascent as a major threat to the region’s stability and security. In addition, unlike Clinton, Trump has not made the US-Israel friendship conditional upon Israel retrieveing dialogue with the Palestinians in the framework of a “two-state solution”. Rather, he has even supported Israel’s claim to build further settlements in the West Bank, and scored in this way an important point last week, when Netanyahu to both the Israeli and American public presented the opposition to settlements as a policy of “ethnic cleansing”. As said above, this similarity of positions on part of Netanyahu and Trump is now reinforced by last week’s military agreement. Trump, in fact, has always promoted in his political rhetoric an American foreign policy made of non-intervention and isolationism, and this approach of his goes well with the increased capacity of self-defense that the new agreement gives to Israel and that was largely praised by the head of Israel’s National Security Council. Moreover, the agreement contains provisions that force Israel to buy weapons and munitions from the American military industry. These provisions could thus favor the Trump-Netanyahu relationship if the latter’s desire of securing the best munitions and the best contracts possible led him to seek closer ties with a Republican candidate who is strong of the historical bound between his Party and the arms lobby.

 

Therefore, the military agreement signed last week by Washington and Tel Aviv not only strengthens the US-Israel relationship that in the past few years was more than once questioned, but it also influences Netanyahu’s approach to the American elections.

The two dangerous faces of Bibi’s politics

The increase in the number of demolitions of Palestinian houses and the increase in the number of Israeli settlements reveal a dangerous politics embraced by Tel Aviv that the international community should try to counter

 

 

A recent report published by OCHA (the UN agency that deals with the coordination of humanitarian affairs) on the conditions of the Palestinian population in the Palestinian Occupied Territories shed light on some worrying data that deserve attention and require an immediate political response.

According to the data released by the report, in fact, since the beginning of 2016 there has been an increase in the number of demolitions of Palestinian houses perpetrated by the Israeli State. In particular, OCHA reports 684 building as having been demolished since January 2016 – a figure which implies an increase by 25% with respect to the previous year.

 

These demolitions –though harmful for the Palestinian population as a whole- interest in particular East Jerusalem and Area C (a territory corresponding to 60% of the West Bank that according to the Oslo Agreements of 1993 is under Israeli administration), which since the Six-Day War of 1967 have been one of the most delicate issues in the territorial disputes between Israel and Palestine.

The reported demolitions -that mostly involve private houses but also public buildings such as schools and health centres- are justified by Israel either as punitive measures carried out against families whose members have attempted the security of the Israeli state or on the basis of questionably legal pretexts, chief among them the claim that the demolished houses had been built without the required permits.

 

Regarding this last point, however, it is necessary to underline the difficulties encountered by Palestinians when they wish to build houses and need to submit the requests of the relevant permits to Tel Aviv: according to OCHA’s data, in fact, between 2010 and 2014 Palestinian citizens submitted 2,020 requests of which Israel only approved 33. Moreover, according to the agency WAFA, a Palestinian family may be forced to wait up to 12 years and pay up to 70,000 $ in order to obtain the necessary permits.

In front of such state of things, thus, it is not surprising that most Palestinian families proceed with the construction of their houses without waiting for the compulsory but unobtainable permits.

 

The rise in the demolition of Palestinian houses, then, is accompanied by another policy in worrying ascent: the construction of Israeli settlements in those same areas (especially around Hebron and Nablus) where the Palestinian houses have been demolished and where Palestinians are prevented from building.

According to OCHA, today 600,00 Israeli settlers live in the West Bank and East Jerusalem – a number which has more than doubled since the Oslo Agreement and which is in continuous rise: as reported by the watchdog Peace Now, in fact, only last Tuesday the Israeli government approved the construction of 285 new settlements in the West Bank.

 

The reasons for this double-faced Israeli action (now on the rise with the government in the hands of politicians such as Netanyahu, Liberman and Bennett) are of political nature and find their roots in the political calculations of the current establishment.

 

As far as East Jerusalem is concerned, the growing demolition of Palestinian houses is part of the broader politics embraced by the current government and aimed at removing Palestinians from the city by forcing them to build somewhere else, and cancelling any physical, historical and socio-cultural link between the Palestinian population and Jerusalem in order to make of the city an undisputed Jewish urban centre.

As far as the West Bank is concerned, the coordinated policies of demolition and settlement clearly aim to grab as much land as possible and increase the number of Israeli-Jewish inhabitants.

 

By so doing, the same prospect of having in future a Palestinian state is put into question and the legitimacy of the Palestinian national vindications is badly weakened. If the Palestinian population has no land nor houses in East Jerusalem and in the Area C of the West Bank, in fact, how can it justify in the eyes of the international community its quest for a national state comprising the whole of the West Bank and having East Jerusalem as its capital?

Moreover, by so doing, the credibility of the Palestinian leadership (both before the international community and before the Palestinians themselves) is questioned – and this is an aspect of the story in which Israel is particularly interested. Indeed, the more the Palestinian leadership has a faltering credibility and a disputable internal legitimacy, the more it will struggle to elaborate a clear political line and coherent demands, thus making Bibi’s game.

 

From what said thus far, it emerges how the main consequence of Israel’s politics is the weakening of any realistic prospect of a two-state solution. Indeed, with the constant demolition of Palestinian houses, the expulsion of their inhabitants from ever wider areas, and the construction in their place of Israeli settlements where Tel Aviv incentivizes as many Jewish Israelis as possible to settle, the possibility of having a Palestinian state comprising the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem and the whole of the West Bank becomes ever more difficult to be demographically justified.

In other words, the more Israel drives the Palestinians away the more the two-state solution itself is pushed away.

 

Among the other consequences of Israel’s politics, we should then consider the embittering of the political-diplomatic relations between Israel and a Palestinian Authority that finds it (reasonably) difficult to see in the Jewish state a partner sincerely committed to a bilateral solution; and the weakening within the Palestinian political realm of the more moderate factions to the advantage of the more radical fringes opposed to any negotiation and compromise.

 

The data released by OCHA shed thus light on a worrying reality, behind which it is possible to see what is Israel’s de facto policy of annexation.

Nevertheless, these data have received little attention: the international community, and in particular actors close to Israel such as the USA and the EU, are in fact focused on other and more pressing issues in the Middle East –namely, the war in Syria, the deterioration of the security scenario in Lybia, and the threat of the jihadist terrorism embodied by the so-called Islamic State.

Yet, Washington and Brussels, when approaching the Middle Eastern political reality, should remember that what happens in Israel-Palestine has inevitable consequences on the balances of the whole region and therefore deserves constant attention. Acknowledging this, the USA and the EU should exploit the diplomatic influence and the economic and commercial leverages they have with respect to Israel, so as to prevent dangerous dynamics that might not only exasperate the confrontation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority but also come to involve in a spiral of insecurity other actors (state and non-state alike) that are active in the region.

 

[In the picture, Ariel, one of Israel’s settlements in the West bank]